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DISCLAIMERS OF FUTURE INTERESTS: CONTINUING
PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Lawrence Newman* and Albert Kalter**
I. Introduction
This article will present a brief background of the common law and statutory
law relating to disclaimers, the gift, estate and income tax advantages which may
be obtained through the use of disclaimers, and the unresolved issues which limit
the effective use of disclaimers in estate planning. The focus will then shift to a
more detailed consideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Keinath u. Commissioner,' which, while shedding some light on the
developing law, also highlights persisting questions. Finally, attention will be
directed to legislative proposals for uniformity and simplification.
The term disclaimer is used in this article to refer to the gratuitous refusal
of benefits tendered by testamentary bequest, by intestacy, or by inter vivos gift,
and is used interchangeably with the term renunciation. Disclaimers are distinguished from releases, compromises, and elections, which involve surrenders of
interests already accepted, exchanges of benefits or the choice of one interest
instead of another.
II. Background: Common Law and State Statutes
The common law has long recognized the right of a beneficiary under a will
to effectively disclaim an interest which otherwise would pass to him.2 An effective disclaimer of a testamentary interest generally relates back to the time of
the testator's death, preventing title from vesting in the beneficiary.' However, a
disclaimer of an intestate share is not generally regarded as effective to prevent
* LAWRENCE NEWMAN is a member of the New York Bar and is a partner in the
firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in New York City. He is a member of the
Faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and is Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Gross Estate Problems of the American Bar Association Committee on Estate and Gift
Taxes. He has lectured on disclaimers at the University of Miami Institute on Estate Planning,
at the New York University Institute on Federal Taxation, and at Practising Law Institute
programs.
** ALBERT KALTER is a member of the New York Bar and is a Certified Public Accountant. He practices law in New York City and is Associate Professor of Taxation at Pace University, New York. He is Chairman of the Subcommittee on Recent Developments of the
American Bar Association Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes and is a member of the Committee on Taxation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. He has lectured at
the New York University Institute on Federal Taxation and at Practising Law Institute programs.
The authors appreciate the valuable assistance of Mr. P. Alan Bulliner and of Mr. Daniel
Newman in the preparation of this article.
1 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rez'g, 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
2 Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933);
T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 139 (2d ed. 1953) (cases collected in
n.2. p. 774) ; 6 BowE-PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 49.2 (1962) (cases collected in n.1 pp. 39-40).
3 See e.g., Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641
(1933); People v. Flanagin, 331 Il. 203, 162 N.E. 848 (1928).
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the vesting of title.' An attempted disclaimer of an intestate share has accordingly
been held to constitute a transfer for gift tax purposes.' No logical reason exists
for this distinction,6 and recent statutory enactments have specifically recognized
the right of a taker under intestacy to disclaim. 7 Case law in many states has also
been uncertain in determining whether a disclaimer must be in writing, or
whether an oral declaration is sufficient." Here again, state statutes have made
some progress by requiring a written document.9
A crucial question often raised relates to the period after death, gift, or
other legally significant event"0 within which the disclaimer must be made to be
effective. The prevailing case law approach has been to establish a presumption
that a gift is accepted." This presumption, although initially rebuttable by a disclaimer, becomes conclusive after acts by the beneficiary inconsistent with his
refusal to accept or after passage of an unreasonable length of time.'2 Not
surprisingly this approach has led to diverse results as to the effectiveness of a
disclaimer within a specific period of time.' The situation is further confused by
4 Hardenbergh v. Comm'r., 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836
(1952); Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N.W.2d 729 (1943); Bostian v. Milens, 239
Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W.2d 797 (1946); T. ATKINSON, supra note 2, § 139; PAGE supra note

2, § 49.2.

5 See e.g., Hardenbergh v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 63 '(8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
836 (1952).
6 PAGE, supra note 2, § 49.1; Disclaimer of Testamentary and Non-Testamentary Dispositions--Suggestions for Model Acts, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 658 (1969); Lauritzen. Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 568, 569 (1953). Cf. Farnum v. Bryant,
34 N.H. 2 (1856).
7 AIASICA STAT. § 13.11.295(a) (Supp. 1973); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-43
(1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-300 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.37 (1964);
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-824 (1959); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 538-1 (1967); IDAHO CODE, § 15-2801 (Supp. 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 15b (Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-1-6-4
(Code Ed. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2291 (Supp. 1972); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 977
(West 1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 9-101 (1969); MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 26.1236(1)
(Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.532 (1969); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.490 (Vernon
1956); Laws of Neb., 82d Leg., 1st Sess., Leg. Bill No. 535 (1971); N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-10 (1966); LAWS OF N.D., 43d
Leg., House Bill No. 1040 '(1973) (effective July 1, 1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.061
(Page 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-5-1 (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 43-4-29
(Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-3 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.13 '(1971).
See also, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801.
8 Writing Necessary: Pournelle v. Baxter, 151 Fla. 32, 9 So. 2d 162 (1942); Bryan v.
Hyre, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 94 (1842). Oral disclaimer sufficient: Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d
914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933); Coleman v. Burns, 103 N.H. 313,
171 A.2d 33 (1961); Olsen v. Wright, 119 N.J. Eq. 103, 181 A. 182 (1935); Matter of
Wilson, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E.2d 852 (1949); Tarr v. Robinson, 158 Pa. 60, 27 A. 859
(1893).
9 Such references to writings are included in nearly all the statutes listed in note 7
supra. In some states, however, it is not clear whether the statutory form of written disclaimer
is exclusive. Cf. Note, Taxation: Disclaimers Under Federal and Minnesota Law, 51 MINN.
L. REv. 907, 925-26 (1967).
10 See note 32 infra.
11 See e.g., Hardesty v. Corrothers, 31 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. W. Va. 1940); In re Kalt's
Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940); People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 162 N.E. 848
(1928); Mackey v. Bowen, 332 Mass. 167, 124 N.E.2d 254 (1955); Seifner v. Weller, 171
S.W.2d 617 *(Mo. 1943); Matter of Wilson, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E.2d 852 (1949); Roop v.
Greenfield, 352 Pa. 232, 42 A.2d 614 (1945).
12 In re Kales Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940); Strom v. Wood, 100 Karn.
556, 164 P. 1100 (1917); Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo. 255, 147 S.W.2d 424 (1941) ; Blake v.
Blake, 147 Ore. 43, 31 P.2d 768 (1934); PAGE, supra note 2, § 49.8.
13 Extreme results are represented by In re Howe, 112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 A. 234 (1932),
(4 months - too long) and Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943), "(16 monthsnot too long) ; for further discussion of this case. see text at note 51, infra. See also, Brown v.
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the fact that case law in some states allows a beneficiary to partially disclaim by
accepting one or more interests, or parts of an interest, while rejecting others
14
intended to pass under the same instrument. Recent state statutes have tended
to recognize partial disclaimers, and specify a time limit, usually less than one
year, for disclaiming.'5
Another important question arises as to the disposition of property disclaimed by a legatee under a will. At common law the general rule was that the
property passed as if the disclaimed legacy or devise had never been made.'The more modem approach, indicated by several recent state statutes,' is to treat
the disclaimed interest under the anti-lapse statutes so that unless the testator

has provided otherwise the property passes as if the disclaimant had died just
before the testator's death or other event by which the interest would have passed
to the disclaimant.'

Clearly the most common reasons for a refusal to accept a beneficial legacy
are to minimize or avoid the exposure of such assets to the claims of taxing
authorities and creditors. It now seems settled that such motives themselves do
not invalidate an otherwise effective disclaimer.' 9 In the area of creditors' rights
some protection is provided by requiring a disclaimer to be free of fraud and
collusion."0 Thus, a disclaimer accompanied by consideration flowing to the
disclaimant from one to whom the disclaimed property would pass will not be
allowed to frustrate a creditor's claim against the disclaimant." Some statutes
are more solicitous of creditors' rights,22 and the result, if not the rationale, of
Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933), (no time limit
exists in Ohio; disclaimer made eight years after testators death-effective).
14 See Note, supra note 9 at 919; Annot., 91 A.L.R. 607 (1934).
15 An example of a "permissive" statute in regard to partial disclaimers is N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRusTS LAW §§ 3-3.10 and 4-1.3. In regard to time limits, extreme results are
represented by HAwAn Rav. STAT. § 538-2 (1967) (15 months) and OHIo Rxv. CODE ANN.
§ 2105.061 (1968) (60 days).
16 Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943); Dare v. New Brunswick Trust Co.,
122 N.J. Eq. 349, 194 A. 61 (1937); Inre Bute's Estate, 355 Pa. 170, 49 A.2d 339 (1946).
Thus, property disclaimed would pass under a residuary clause of the will or, failing that,
under the laws of intestacy. If the disclaimant is also an heir, his efforts may ultimately be
frustrated by state law which does not recognize the right of an heir to disclaim. Maxwell v.
Comm'r., 17 T.C. 1589 (1952). See notes 4-7 supra.
17 See e.g., COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-43 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.37
(1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.532 (1969); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.10
(McKinney 1967).
18 Ultimate disposition of the property disclaimed thus depends also on the nature of
the state's anti-lapse statute. A few statutes provide that if any beneficiary predeceases the
testator, the bequest passes to surviving issue of the beneficiary (See e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 41-3-3 (1966)), but most limit this result to cases where the deceased beneficiary was related
to the testator. See e.g., IDAHO CODE § 15-2-605 (Supp. 1973). Where the deceased is not
so related, or no issue survive the testator, or no anti-lapse provision exists, the common law
rule applies. See note 16 supra. When the disclaimer involves a future interest, additional
questions arise. For a discussion of this situation, see notes 92-95 infra.
19 See e.g., United States v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960); In re
Estate of Hansen, 109 Ill. App. 2d 283, 248 N.E.2d 709 (1969); Schoonover v. Osborne,
193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); In Re Krakoff's Estate, 179 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio 1961).
Contra, In Re Kales Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1940).
20 Schoonover v. Osborne. 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); Bradford v. Calhoun,
120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 (1908).
21 Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 "(1908).

22 See e.g., IND. ANN.

STAT.

§ 29-1-6-4 (Code Ed. 1972): "[N]o such renunciation shall

be effective if it is objected to within thirty (30) days by a creditor .. . and if the court
finds that the creditor is prejudiced thereby"; MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 525.532(5) (1969):
"The right to disclaim otherwise conferred by this Section shall be barred if the beneficiary
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some cases suggests that courts examine disclaimers more critically when creditors'

rights are involved. 3 The position of taxing authorities in regard to disclaimers
will be considered in subsequent sections of this article.
III. Use of Disclaimers in Estate Planning
Since an effective disclaimer prevents title from vesting in the disclaimant,
it offers a means of reducing the number of transfers and resulting transfer taxes.

Consider the case of a testator who leaves property to A with a residuary disposition in favor of B. A, having no use for the property or preferring that B have it,
may disclaim. The disclaimer will, at least under the common law, pass the
property to B and will serve to avoid the gift tax which would result from a gift
to B or the estate tax which would otherwise result on the death of A.24

Avoidance of the transfer tax is especially attractive where the parties are members of the same family since the disclaimer only rearranges property within the
family unit. A disclaimer in favor of a family member in a lower income tax
bracket will also produce prospective income tax benefits.2 5 And where, as a
result of the disclaimer, property passes from a decedent to his surviving spouse
or to charity, the estate tax liability will be reduced by reason of the marital or

charitable deduction.2" While these potential planning benefits can hardly be

ignored, the use of disclaimers in estate planning is seriously limited at the present
time by uncertainties in the law. Keinath. v. Commissioner," decided by the

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, highlights two of the major problems
surrounding the federal tax questions: the interplay of state and federal law and
the treatment of future interests.
Brown v.Routzalhn2" was the first case to recognize that a disclaimer of a
testamentary transfer could pass property to another person without imposition
of the gift tax. From that case, subsequent cases,29 Internal Revenue Code
provisions," and Treasury Regulations,"1 it seems clear that a disclaimer can be
isinsolvent . . . ."; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.490 (1956): "mhe renunciation shall be subject
to the rights of creditors .. " Contra, M. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 9-101 (1969): "Creditors
of the renouncing legatee or heir have no interest in the property renounced .... "
23 See Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo. 255, 147 S.W.2d 424 '(1941); Strom v. Wood, 100
Kan. 556, 164 P. 1100 (1917). For further discussion of these cases, see notes 52 and 58-60
infra.
24 For the connon law system of disposing of disclaimed property, see note 16 supra.
The gift tax is avoided under Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c). The estate tax is avoided because
the property will not be part of A's estate at his death. In both cases, the rationale is that
A never had any interest in the property.
25 Income tax liability can also be avoided through disclaimer of a power to vest income
in oneself. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 678(d).
26 INT. REV. CODa OF 1954 §§ 2056(d) (2) (marital deduction) and 2055(a) (charitable
deduction). However, where a full marital deduction is otherwise available, a disclaimer in
favor of a surviving spouse will not further reduce the estate tax liability.
27 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973). rev'g, 58 T.C. 352 '(1972).
28 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
29 Hardenbergh v. Comm'r., 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836
(1952); Maxwell v. Comm'r., 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
30 INT. REV. CODE oF 1954 §§ 678(d) (disclaimer of power to vest income in oneself),
2041(a)'(2) (disclaimer of power of appointment under estate tax), 2056(d) (2) (disclaimer
increasing marital deduction under estate tax) and 2055(a) (disclaimer increasing charitable
deduction under estate tax).
31 Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2041-3(d) (6), 20.2056(d)-r (b), 25.2511-1(c), and 25.251 4 - 3 (c) (5).
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effective for federal tax purposes if the disclaimer is: 1) permitted under state
law, 2) effective under local law, 3) made within a reasonable time, and 4) unequivocal. By reason of the dependence on state law for effectiveness, federal
tax consequences will vary from state to state. Moreover, effectiveness of a disclaimer under state law, while a necessary condition for federal tax purposes, is
not alone sufficient. The disclaimer must also be made within a reasonable time
in order to be recognized for federal tax purposes. The vagueness of the reasonable time requirement presents an obstacle even in a state which has clear
statutory guidelines for determining the validity of a disclaimer.
The treatment of future interests is a closely related problem. Where one
wishes to disclaim a future interest, the question is not only how long a period
of time is available to disclaim, but also when that period begins to run."2 Regulation § 25.2511-1 (c), which requires that the refusal be made "within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer," makes no special allowance for future interests. A beneficiary might accordingly be required to
disclaim a future interest years before it vests or ripens into possession.
It is also appropriate to consider whether the disclaimer should be available
as an estate planning technique. Another form of the question is whether taxing
authorities should be protected from the consequences of disclaimers to the same
extent as, or to a greater extent than, creditors. It has been suggested"3 that
Brown v. Routzahn,3 ' holding that a properly executed disclaimer was not a
taxable transfer within the meaning of the federal gift tax statute, may have been
wrongly decided. This argument is advanced partly on the basis of the intention
of Congress to tax every gratuitous transfer and partly upon the more general
proposition that gift and estate taxes should operate in such a way as to minimize
rather than protect the accumulation of inherited wealth.3" Clearly the disclaimer
device will be most useful to those of substantial wealth. Furthermore, it is
contended that, although the disclaimant's control is limited to a choice between
accepting the property or passing it to a substituted taker determined by law,
the fact that the substituted taker can usually be determined before the decision
to disclaim is made should be enough to impute to the disclaimant sufficient
donative intent to bring the transaction within the gift tax statute.3 6
Imposition of a transfer tax would have to be based on the disclaimant's
control of the property. Theoretically, an effective disclaimer deprives the disclaimant of possession and enjoyment. It is accordingly questionable whether
32 Some state statutes specify such a starting point in terms that may be susceptible of
ambiguous interpretation. See e.g., "the event which would cause . . . [the disclaimant] to
become finally ascertained and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed both in quantity and
quality." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.37(5) (1964); "the event by which the taker or . . . the
interest is finally ascertained." GA. CODE ANN. § 113-824(b) (1959); "Any person entitled
to a reversion or a remainder in fee in real estate may disclaim . . . within six months after
he comes into possession thereof.. . ." R1I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-5-5 (1970). Section 34-5-6
of the Rhode Island statute makes the same provision for personal property. See Note, supra
note 9, at 931-939, finding serious difficulties in construing the phrases "finally ascertained"
and "indefeasibly fixed in quantity and quality."
33 See Note. supra note 32, at 911-12.

34 63 F.2d 914 '(6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
35 See, JOINT COMM. ON THE EcoNoami REPORT, 84Tr CONG., 1ST Sass.,
DATIONS FOR REVISION OF FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 864-65 (1955).
36 See Note, supra note 9, at 910.
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the option to accept or refuse property is a sufficient basis to justify a tax.17
Finally, it must be realized that a disclaimer will rarely, if ever, achieve tax advantages that could not have been achieved by updating the decedent's will or by
inter vivos trust arrangements. The federal law seems clearly settled in favor of
recognizing a disclaimer of property as a valid tax avoidance device. Consistent
with the case law, the Code provisions and the Regulations previously referred
to, 8 Congress, as recently as 1966, amended the Code to permit property disclaimed in favor of a surviving spouse to qualify for the marital deduction.89
The debate nevertheless continues. In Keinath, the Tax Court, in holding
the disclaimer to be subject to the gift tax, stated the view that:
The exception from taxation for disclaimers was designed to permit a donee
. . .; it should not be used
to avoid receiving an unwanted gift or bequest
40
as an estate-planning and tax avoidance tool.
The Court of Appeals, holding the disclaimer to be effective for tax purposes,
reversed the Tax Court stating:
[Comment is in order on the following excerpt of the Tax Court's opinion:
[quoting the passage above]. ... We think in giving full and fair effect to
Persons
the law of disclaimer that a person's motives are immaterial ....
have a right to and should consider the tax consequences.... There appears
to be nothing morally reprehensible or legally wrong for a person who has
never received the benefit or income from a bequest, to disclaim that bequest .... 41

IV. The Impact of Keinath
Granting that the above language of the Court of Appeals in Keinath encourages the use of disclaimers in estate planning, the question remains whether
the decision provides any real assistance in clarifying the federal law and future
interest issues. The facts of the Keinath case can be stated briefly. John H.
MacMillan, Sr. died in 1944 and his will disposed of most of his estate in trust,
with income to be paid to his widow, Edna, for life. Upon Edna's death, the
principal was to be divided equally between the decedent's two sons, John, Jr.
and Cargill, with the condition that if either should predecease the widow, his
share should be distributed, per stirpes, among his children. John, Jr. and
Cargill were designated as the trustees, with the surviving son to become sole
trustee if one predeceased the widow.
In 1960 John, Jr. died, survived by three children. In March 1963 the
widow died-the trust then being valued at approximately $1,300,000. In May
of 1963, Cargill, then sixty-three years of age, signed a disclaimer of his interest in
the trust and specified that the disclaimer was not to take effect until filed with
37 Id. at 908-909.
38 See notes 28-31 supra.
39 Act of Oct. 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-621. 80 Stat. 872 (now

§ 2056(d) (2)).

40 Keinath v. Comnm'r., 58 T.C. 352, 359 (1972).
41 Keinath v. Comm'r., 480 F.2d 57, 65-66 (8th Cir. 1973).

INT.

REV. CoDE OF 1954
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the state court having jurisdiction. He then petitioned that court for an interpretation of the effect of the disclaimer. The Minnesota court, in September 1963,
held the disclaimer timely and valid and ruled that Cargilrs half of the trust
remainder passed to his three children. 2 Cargill died in 1968. After his death
the government determined that his attempted disclaimer constituted a gift and
assessed gift tax deficiencies of approximately $150,000. The dispute was reduced
to the single issue of whether the purported disclaimer was a taxable transfer.
The facts were stipulated and Cargill's interest was stated to be a vested remainder subject to divestment if he predeceased his mother. 3
A. The Tax Court Opinion
The Tax Court noted that no decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
covered these particular facts. Under the Bosch doctrine," the lower state court
ruling was not binding upon the Tax Court. The Tax Court concluded, however, that even if the disclaimer were effective under Minnesota law, there was
a further federal test to be met, the reasonable time test, and Cargill's declaration
did not meet this test. These conclusions rested primarily on the Court's decision
in Fullerv.Commissioner."5
Fuller dealt with an attempted partial renunciation of an income interest
twenty-five years after its creation, during which time the disclaimant had
received income. The state court had held the disclaimer to be effective under
state law, but the Tax Court refused to give it effect for gift tax purposes. The
opinion relied on the language of the Gift Tax Regulations, § 25.2511-1(c),
requiring that a disclaimer, in addition to being effective under state law, be
made within a reasonable time and prior to acceptance. Without citing cases,
the court in Fuller concluded that there had been an acceptance and held the
purported disclaimer, twenty-five years after creation of the interest, not to have
been made within a reasonable time.
The petitioners in Keinath contended that Fuller was not conclusive since
Cargill had not accepted income or principal from the trust. They further argued
that the reasonable time test approved in Fuller was no more than dictum. The
Tax Court rejected their argument:
We do not read [Fuller v. Commissioner] as resting upon Mrs. Fullers
acceptance of income from the trust but upon her acceptance of her interest
in the trust. In addition, Mrs. Fuller's receipt of income was only one fact
that we used in testing her conduct against section 25.2511-1(c) .. .to

determine whether her disclaimer should be given effect for gift tax purposes.
42 The basis for the disposition is unclear. The Minnesota disclaimer statute passed in
1966 was not applicable to Cargilrs 1963 disclaimer. One might have expected application
of the prevailing common law approach, treating the legacy as lapsed and passing the property
through the residuary clause of John, Sr.'s will or by intestacy. See note 16 supra. It seems
unlikely, without further details concerning the will, that such an approach would have passed
Cargill's interest entirely to his children. If the Minnesota court adopted the Minnesota
statute's approach as a matter of preexisting common law, other problems are raised, the
discussion of which appears at notes 92-94 infra.
43 Keinath v. Comm'r., 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
44 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
45 37 T.O. 147 (1961).
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We approved the two-part test of the regulation-that the disclaimer be
valid under local law and made within a reasonable time after the disclaimant learns of the transfer-and
found that Mrs. Fuller failed to satisfy
46
the "reasonable time" part.
The Tax Court, in Keinath, was even less receptive to the petitioners' claim
that, if the Regulation established a reasonable time test, the reasonable time
should not include the time during which the interest remained defeasible. While
not directly answering this point, the opinion noted that throughout this period
Cargill knew of the interest and its beneficial character, and had been able to
disclaim earlier. The opinion of the Tax Court concludes with language, already
mentioned, adopting a broad construction of Section 2511 and expressing disfavor with the use of disclaimers as a technique of tax avoidance.
The Tax Court's opinion in Keinath thus contains at least two warnings
against the use of disclaimers in estate planning. First, that compliance with
state law is not alone sufficient-to be recognized for federal tax purposes the disclaimer must, in addition, be made within a reasonable time; and second, that
a disclaimer of a future interest is subject to the same criteria as a disclaimer of
present interests even though the former may be remote in possession and not
indefeasibly vested. Not surprisingly, the decision intensified preexisting efforts to
amend the tax law.4
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
It might have been expected that the appellate court would either agree
with the Tax Court's reliance on Fullerin applying a federal reasonable time test,
or rule that state law controls the issue of the validity of a disclaimer for federal
tax purposes. Strictly speaking, it did neither. The latter position was specifically
rejected by the Court: ". . . we think the Commissioner has the right in the
Treasury Regulations to set forth the conditions under which disclaimers will
be recognized." 48 The disagreement with the Tax Court was thus not over the
existence of the federal reasonable time standard but over the interpretation of
that standard: ". . . we perforce, absent a federal statute or regulation defining
reasonable time, must look to the law of the states. We are not conclusively
bound by the state law, but this is the only field to probe for legal decisions and
discussions on the phrase 'reasonable time'.. . ."9 The refusal to rely on Fuller
was based on the presence of the prior acceptance factor in that case, rendering it
unnecessary for the Tax Court to have reached the reasonable time question.
The disagreement with the Tax Court hardly seems important since Fullerwould
do little to establish a reasonable time test, standing only for the unsupported
assertion that twenty-five years is not a reasonable time.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals surveys five decisions,"0 from the courts
46

Keinath v. Comm'r., 58 T.C. 352, 358-59 (1972).

47

COMMITTEE ON ESTATE AND GiFT TAXEs, LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION.

48 Keinath v. Comm'r., 480 F.2d 57, 61
49 Id. at 61-62.
50 Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164
617 (Mo. 1943); Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo.
103 N.H. 313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961); Perkins

(8th Cir. 1973).
P. 1100 (1917); Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d
255, 147 S.W.2d 424 (1941); Coleman v. Burns,
v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588 (1945).

[Vol. 49:827]

DISCLAIMERS OF FUTURE INTERESTS

of four states, relating to reasonable time. No mention is made of the different
points from which the times are calculated or of certain equitable factors (e.g.,
burdened interests,5 ' and creditors' rights 2 ) which may have influenced those
decisions. At any rate, the survey leads to the unremarkable conclusion that 19
years from the creation of the remainder to the date of disclaimer was not a
reasonable period of time, but that 6 months from the date of vesting to the date
of disclaimer was reasonable. The court thus proceeded almost as if no independent federal requirement was to be applied. The analysis of state court
cases and other authorities is presumably what the Supreme Court of Minnesota
would have done to determine the state law validity of a disclaimer not covered
by its 1965 statute or case law. The opinion states:
We hold, therefore, that under the prevailing common law and, in particular, the jurisdiction of the State of Minnesota,... an unequivocal disclaimer
filed within six months ... [after the death of the life beneficiary] is made
within a reasonable time"8 [emphasis added].
One would assume that in a case arising in a state where the effectiveness of disclaimers is defined by statute or case law, the federal courts would still be required
to apply the federal reasonable time test. If the Keinath survey of state decisions
is indeed the federal standard for reasonable time, it is, of course, far too vague.
Nothing is said about disclaimers after delays of six months to nineteen years. A
case-by-case narrowing of this gap would be too painful for litigants and too

burdensome for the courts.
Regarding the dispositive question of the starting point for the commencement of the reasonable time period-a question decided but not discussed by the
Tax Court-the Court concluded54 that the reasonable time period does not
start to run until the remainder interest becomes indefeasibly vested-in the
Keinath case at the death of the widow:
The appellants maintain, without any refutation by the Commissioner, that
all of the authorities who have considered this question have concluded that
51 In Selfner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943), the devise of a remainder interest
in a farm to the discIalmant was subject to a charge of equalizing shares of siblings in the
testator's estate. It appears that the farm proved to be worth less than the value placed on it
in the will, so that the disclaimant found the arrangement burdensome. The disclaimer was
held effective although not made until 16 months after the death of the life tenant (14 years
after the death of the testator) during which period the disclaimant occupied the land.
52 Both Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 P. 1100 (1917) and Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo.
255, 147 S.W.2d 424 (1941), were cases in which the would-be disclaimants of remainder interests sought to avoid the claims of creditors. In Strom, the creditor's judgment predated the
testator's death and the disclaimer was filed approximately five years after death, but apparently
while the life tenant was still alive. In Sanders, the disclaimer was filed fifteen months after
the testator's death, while the life tenant was still alive. Although the creditors did not seek
attachment until the life tenant died, the notes sued on had apparently been due since before
the testator's death. Both disclaimers were held to be ineffective. For further discussion of
these cases, see notes 56-58 infra.
53 Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 64 (8th Cir. 1973).
54 In its opinion, the Tax Court referred to Page on Wills, the Minnesota disclaimer
statute adopted after the Keinath disclaimer, and the Model Act on Disclaimers. See Page,
supra note 2, § 49.8; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.532(3) (1969); and MODEL ACT TO PROVIDE
FOR DISCLAIMER OF SUCCESSION TO REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2, 4 REAL PROP., PROB.
& Th. J. 658 (1969).
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the time in which a remainder interest subject to divestiture must be disclaimed commences upon the death of the life beneficiary, which in turn
allows the remainder interest to be irrevocably fixed not subject to divestment. We have found no contrary authority and think this is the prevailing
common law rule ....

55

Without making an exhaustive search of the literature, one can determine
that this conclusion considerably oversimplifies even those cases cited in the
opinion. In Strom v. Wood56 a disclaimer was held to have been made too late
although made before the death of the life tenant, the remainder interest having
been subject to partial divestment (to the extent of one-half). Although the
Keinath decision suggests that the right to disclaim was lost only in regard to
the half which was not subject to divestment,5" this is less than clear from the
Strom opinion. In Sanders v. Jones,5" another of the cases discussed in the
court's survey of reasonable time decisions, the disallowed disclaimer was made
before the death of the life tenant, and although the court there did not decide
the point, the interest appears to have been subject to divestment. As these cases
suggest, the authorities relied on do not generally seem to have taken cognizance
of the distinction which the Eighth Circuit appears to be making, namely, that an
interest absolutely vested at its creation must be disclaimed within a reasonable
time of its creation, while a vested interest subject to divestment (and, presumably, a contingent remainder), need not be disclaimed until after the event
which results in absolute vesting. The courts in Coleman v.Burns," Seifner v.
Weller" and In Re Estate of Page6 ' all allow late disclaimers of future interests
without indicating that the result would be different if the remainder had absolutely vested. Indeed, it is at least arguable that such was the case in Seifner.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion is itself not unequivocal in establishing absolute
vesting as the point of commencement of the time period for disclaiming. At one
point the opinion states:
It thus appears from the adjudicated cases that remainder interests that
are not subject to divestiture should be disclaimed within a reasonable time
after the testator's death, and where the remainder interest is subject to
divestiture a disclaimer may62be filed within a reasonable time after the
termination of the life estate.
However at another point the opinion states a question "[clentral to this case":
"In other words is the reasonable time period calculated from the date the remainderman has the right of possession or control of the property or when the
trust is established?"6 As indicated above, some of the cases relied upon hold,
or suggest, that the reasonable time period starts at the date of possession, even
55
56
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Keinath v. Comm'r., 480 F.2d 57, 64 (8th Cir. 1973).
100 Kan. 556, 164 P. 1100 (1917).
Keinath v. Comm'r., 480 F.2d 57, 62 (8th Cir. 1973).
347 Mo. 255, 147 S.W.2d 424 (1941).
103 N.H. 313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961).
171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo.1943).
113 N.J. Super. 582, 274 A.2d 614 (1970).
Keinath v.Comm'r., 480 F.2d 57, 63 (8th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 61. [emphasis added].
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where the remainder was absolutely vested at a point earlier in time. The court
also quotes Page that:

If the interest is one which will not take effect in immediate possession, even
if accepted, it is said that the remainderman... has the entire period during which the particular estate lasts, to determine whether he accepts or
renounces. 64

The next section of this article reviews the further question of whether the

proposed distinction between absolutely and defeasibly vested interests serves a
useful purpose, or whether the required time for disclaimer of all future interests
should be postponed until vesting in possession.
V. The Need for Legislation
The disagreement between the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals illustrates the confused state of the law on disclaimers and explains the general
hesitancy in the utilization of disclaimers. While the reversal of the Tax Court's
decision in Keinath creates a more hospitable environment for the use of disclaimers and sheds some light on the law, important questions remain. The
major questions facing the Court of Appeals in Keinath were the length of the
reasonable time period and the point at which that time period commences. To
the first question, only a limited answer is given, with no clear guidelines to be
applied in other situations. To the second question the answer seems more
definitive, but the opinion seems equally consistent with an alternative answer,
and no reasoned basis is given for choosing one over the other. The continuing
existence of this type of confusion presents a situation ripe for legislative consideration. Legislative action also promises benefits in other areas, where the
common law of disclaimer seems unclear or irrational. Attention here, however,
will be limited to the problems raised by Keinath.
As noted earlier, a number of states have passed statutes in recent years
establishing time requirements. Both Model and Uniform Acts have been proposed embodying such a feature. The state statutes that have been enacted
establish periods from two to fifteen months;65 the Model Act proposes ten
months,68 and the Uniform Act would establish six months as the reasonable
time for disclaiming an interest. 67 If state law alone were determinative of the
issue of reasonable time, the problem of providing a definitive federal time period
for disclaiming an interest would be solved in those states having disclaimer
statutes. The Uniform Act would then be aimed at reaching those states which
had not acted, and conforming the state laws so that federal tax consequences
would not depend on domicile. Obviously, such a goal is desirable. The time
64 Id. at 63.
65 See note 15 supra.
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NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT ACT AND UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS UNDER NONTESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS ACT.
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period of the Uniform Act attempts a reasonable compromise-long enough
for careful consideration and planning but not so long as to raise the risk of
conduct which is inconsistent with a rejection of the property.68 It seems clear,
however, that a Uniform Act would not necessarily settle the reasonable time
question, even in regard to disclaimers of present interests. As discussed earlier,
the Court of Appeals opinion in Keinath may be read as being ambiguous as to
the present existence of an independent federal standard, but clearly recognizes
the power of the Commissioner to impose such a standard.69 Even under current law, the federal courts would presumably be free to use the reasonable
time language of Regulation
§ 25.2511-1 (c) to refuse to recognize a disclaimer
70
effective under state law.
This problem, combined with the inherent problems and delay in the enactment of a Uniform Disclaimer Act by the states, suggests that reform should be
pursued through the federal system. There is currently under study a proposal
for the amendment of the Internal Revenue Code which would establish a ninemonth disclaimer period. 7' Federal amendments would not eliminate differences
in state laws or the consequences of disclaimers in matters other than federal
taxation (such as state inheritance taxes). The proposal for amendment of the
Internal Revenue Code would, however, make federal taxation independent of
the state of domicile by recognizing a disclaimer under certain circumstances
for federal tax purposes even if it was not effective under state law.7 ' The proposal for federal legislation would supersede Regulation § 25.2511-1 (c), which
provides that a disclaimer must be effective under state law. This approach may
raise some problems. For example, if a state court holds that a disclaimer, which
meets the standards of the proposed federal amendment, is ineffective under state
law, what is to become of the property? If the disclaimant enters into possession
and enjoyment, the disclaimer should not be given effect for federal tax purposes
and the property should remain subject to estate and gift taxes. Federal tax
relief should not be extended where the disclaimant transfers the property to
someone of his choice for here control over the disposition of the property has
been exercised, a feature which is incompatible with the concept of a tax effective
disclaimer. 3 The federal proposal 4 accordingly provides that an attempted disclaimer which meets the federal requirements will be given effect for federal tax
purposes, even if it is ineffective under state law, unless the disclaimant accepts
the property or exercises proprietary control. The proposed amendment excludes
the exercise of control which is necessary to effectuate a transfer of the disclaimed
68 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, REPORT OF
COMMITTEE ON DISCLAIMER OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS (Aug. 1972). Since the federal estate
tax return is not required to be filed until nine months after the decedent's death, a nine-month
period would seem equally reasonable.
69 See note 48 supra.
i
70 For a discussion of situations in which the federal courts might be inclined to follow a
state timeliness requirement, see Note, supra note 9, at 916-17.
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73 COMMITTEE ON ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs, supra note 71, at 5; NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, supra note 68.
74 COMMITTEE ON ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES, supra note 71, at 8 (requiring the disclaimant
to execute "appropriate documents effective under applicable state law to ensure that he has
no interest in or title to the property").
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property to the persons who would have been entitled to the property had the
disclaimant predeceased the prior holder of the property. An attempted disclaimer will not be effective under the proposal if the disclaimant retains the
property or gives it to someone other than the person who would have taken the
property had the disclaimant predeceased the prior holder of the property.
A less desirable solution would be to include in the federal statute a requirement that the disclaimant tender the property to the court having jurisdiction
(e.g., the probate court) as a gift to the person or persons who would have taken
if the disclaimer had been effective. This seems unsatisfactory since the state
court might well decline to determine the recipient, the disclaimer having already
been held ineffective under state law. A provision for the use of the federal
courts to dispose of the property, according to state law, as if the disclaimer had
been effective, would raise questions concerning federal power and the proper
role of the federal courts. Continuance of the present requirement that a disclaimer be effective under state law would leave in effect all of the variations
and uncertainties which exist under the present state laws. Precise standards by
which residents of all states could accurately determine the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer of property would appear to be the benefit and purpose
of a federal statute.
The most equitable alternative appears to be the approach of recognizing
for federal tax purposes a disclaimer which is ineffective under state law where
the form of disclaimer complies with federal standards and the disclaimant
transfers the property to the person who would have been entitled to the property
had the disclaimant predeceased the prior holder. This approach is not completely free of uncertainty for the disclaimant is still required to determine the
taker under state law. It is, however, hoped that passage of an amendment to the
Internal Revenue Code, recognizing the disclaimed property as a tax-free transfer,.
would give impetus to serious consideration of the Uniform Disclaimer Act which,
would substantially eliminate the question of substituted takers by making effective disclaimers which meet standards similar to the federal requirements.
Nearly all of the same factors are present in a consideration of the other
major issue in Keinath, namely the standard for determining the commencement
of the reasonable time period in the case of a future interest. It seems clear that
this question is also subject to both state and federal answers, and as discussed
above, neither state nor federal law change alone would be entirely satisfactory. 75
In the language of property law, future interests are divided into the categories of 1) contingent, 2) vested subject to divestment, and 3) absolutely (or
indefeasibly) vested, depending on the existence of a condition precedent, a condition subsequent, or no condition, respectively.7 6 The distinction between a contingent future interest and one vested subject to divestment is more one of form
75 State law provisions, more liberal than those recognized in Keinath, might fail to meet
the federal reasonable time test of TREAS. REo. § 25.2511-1 (c), while federal provisions might
not be effective under state law if the disclaimant is unable to dispose of the property in the
manner prescribed by the state statute. See notes 69-74 supra.
76 See e.g., C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO TE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 114-18 (1962).
For purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to recognize the distinction established between remainders vested subject to partial divestment and remainders vested subject to complete divestment.
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than of substance, with courts preferring to construe ambiguous language as
creating a vested interest.
The Illinois and Minnesota 8 statutes, among others, adopt as the starting
point for the disclaimer period the event by which "the taker has become finally
ascertained and his interest has become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and
quantity."'" The words "quality" and "quantity" are, however, ambiguous.
One commentary on the Minnesota statute has suggested that not only is the
standard not equivalent to "indefeasibly vested," but that it is not susceptible
of any reasonable interpretation consistent with other sections of the Act."
The Eighth Circuit, in the Keinath decision, draws a distinction between
remainders which are vested subject to divestment and remainders absolutely
vested. It would have the time period commence with the testator's death if the
interest was absolutely vested and with the irrevocable vesting of the interest if
the interest was not absolutely vested. As discussed earlier, the distinction
between "absolutely vested" and "vested subject to divestment" is not generally
supported by the limited law"1 on disclaimers of future interests or by the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning in the Keinath opinion. Because a contingent remainder is very much like a remainder vested subject to divestment and because
the former is, if anything, more speculative than the latter, it seems safe to
assume that the Eighth Circuit would allow postponement of a contingent
remainder as well.
There have also been suggestions which would make possession the point at
which the disclaimer period would commence.8 2 This would have the effect of
allowing even an "absolutely vested" remainder to be disclaimed within a period
of time after the life tenant's death rather than after the testator's death. The
Uniform Act and the proposed federal amendment would establish as the starting point of the disclaimer period the event which determines the taker of the
property and renders his interest indefeasible.8 2
For practical reasons, it might seem preferable to dispense with indefeasibility and absolute vesting as the standard and to allow disclaimers to be made
within a specified time after the interest vests in possession and enjoyment. The
most obvious advantage would be simplicity. Construction problems and uncertainty in planning would be minimized. Secondly, a standard of indefeasibility or absolute vesting could be circumvented by creating a vested remainder subject to unlikely divestment. For example, the non-existence of the divesting condition may not be ascertainable until the time when the interest becomes possessory. In such instance the remainder would be absolutely vested in fact, but
subject to divestment in law. Suppose a testator wished C, the intended recipient of a future interest, to retain the right to disclaim, but to have maximum
77
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control for as long as possible. Could not a well-advised testator word the disposition so as to provide a life estate for W, with the remainder passing to C,
but if great-grandchildren of C are living at W's death, then to G? C could now
wait until W's death to disclaim since the remainder is formally subject to divestment.84 C's possession would still depend on surviving W, but he would now
retain the option of disclaiming the remainder interest, free of estate and gift
taxes, until termination of W's life estate only because of the existence of a condition which is extremely unlikely to occur.
It seems unreasonable to base the test of timeliness on indefeasibility unless
the designations "absolutely vested" and "subject to divestment" have sufficient
other significance to justify different disclaimer time requirements. The question,
thus, is whether a remainder's character as absolutely vested has any impact on its
ownership or control. A hypothetical situation may help to point out some of the
considerations. Consider the following situation, not materially different from
the facts in Keinath. Testator wishes, through his will, to provide for his wife,
W, during her lifetime, and then to pass the family wealth to his only child, C,
at W's death. In the event C should die before W, testator wishes the estate to
pass to C's only child, G. The will might be drawn in three different ways:
1. Income to W for life, remainder to C if C survives W, otherwise to G.
2. Income to W for life, remainder to C; but if C should predecease W,
then to G.
3. Income to W for life, remainder to C.
The first formulation would be construed as passing to C a contingent
remainder, the second, a vested remainder subject to divestment, and the third,
an absolutely vested remainder.85 Under the Keinath or "indefeasible" test, C
could postpone his disclaimer under formulations 1 and 2, but not under 3.
Obviously, if C survives W, his subsequent enjoyment of the property is completely unaffected by the form of the will provision. To ascertain any differences
we must consider the period during the life of W, the income beneficiary. While
W is alive, C may dispose of his interest by sale or gift.88 He may also formally
accept the interest. His right to disclaim after acceptance is barred in all instances.8 The only consequence of the choice between formulations 1, 2, and 3
would be in the monetary value of the interest (greater for 3 than for 1 or 2).
C may also wish to consider the possibility that he will predecease W. Under
84 It may be argued that where the divesting condition is very unlikely (not clearly related to any express or implied intent of the testator, or obviously added to allow postponement
of the disclaimer), the Commissioner and the courts could look beyond the form to the substance and hold the disclaimer ineffective under the time limitation. While this may well be
so, such an approach would only increase estate planning uncertainty, since the factual criteria
for a court's decision would be difficult to formulate.
85 1 L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, THE LAw oF FuvuRa INTERESTS § 147 (2d ed. 1956),
(distinguishing between formulations 1 and 2). Formulation 3 passes an absolutely vested
remainder because possession is subject only to the preceding estate. Formulation 2 is equivalent to the situation in Keinath, where the remainder was vested subject to divestment.
86 At least under the prevalent modem view, remainders, whether they be vested or contingent, are freely alienable. See 4 L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, supra note 85, §§ 1854-59.
87 Disposition of an interest by sale or gift is an "acceptance" of the property comparable
to that arising through use and enjoyment. Even in the case of a transfer without consideration,
there can be no subsequent disclaimer, since the donor has exercised control over the property.
See note 73 supra.
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formulations 1 and 2, C would have no control over the disposition of the
property; but under formulation 3, 's future interest would pass according to
the provisions of his will or according to the laws of intestacy. Thus, a remainder
which is indefeasible does provide its owner with the significant power to control the disposition of the property upon his death.88 In addition, a person
possessing an indefeasible interest knows the full extent of his interest. Thus,
having the disclaimer period begin when the interest becomes indefeasible would
seem to be reasonable.
The proposed rule allowing disclaimers to be made after the interest has
become indefeasible suggests one additional question concerning the disposition
of the disclaimed interest. Modem disclaimer statutes, as noted earlier, take an
anti-lapse approach. 9 Under the indefeasible interest rule proposed here, an
effective disclaimer may be made many years after the testator's death. In such
case, disposition of the property as if the disclaimant had predeceased the testator
may be complicated; the substituted taker, being determined as of the time of
the testator's death, may have died in the intervening years, and the administration of his estate may have long been terminated. At least one state appears to
have attempted to solve this problem by considering the disclaimant to have died
immediately before the event by which the interest became "indefeasibly fixed
both in quantity and quality,"8 " i.e., the event which commences the disclaimer
period. There appear to be two problems with this approach. First, anti-lapse
statutes usually provide only for the situation where a beneficiary dies before the
testator.91 Presumably, this problem could be corrected by amending the antilapse statute to deal specifically with disclaimers of future interests. A more
serious problem is that this scheme is inconsistent with the theoretical basis of
disclaimers relating back in every regard to the testator's death.92
88 Of course, the actual exercise of such power bars any disclaimer. It might be argued
that a devise or bequest of the future interest, being revocable, should not operate as an
acceptance until the remainderman's death, but the better view would seem to be to treat this
as a waiver of the right to disclaim. Even if C dies intestate, or does not mention the interest
in his will, the interest would be considered accepted at C's death, at least in those states
which do not recognize the right of an executor or administrator to disclaim. Cf. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ACTS, supra note 67, § 1: "The right to disclaim does not survive the death of the person entitled to disclaim . . . ." with MINN. STAT.

ANN. § 525.532(2), which allows an executor or administrator to disclaim within the time
and in the manner that the beneficiary could have disclaimed if alive.
89 See notes 17-18 supra.
90 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.532(5) (1969).
91 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.203 (1965) provides that: "If a devise or bequest be made
to a child or other blood relative of the testator who dies before the testator leaving issue who
survive the testator, such issue shall take the same estate which such devisee or legatee would
have taken if he had survived, unless a different disposition be made or required by the will."
Thus, § 525.203 does not cover the application of § 525.532(5) to the Keinath facts, since
Cargill is considered to have died immediately before his mother, and after the testator. Section 525.532(5) can be read as requiring that the property be distributed to the disclaimant's
heirs, determined as of the time of the event by which the interest became indefeasibly fixed in
quantity and quality. This interpretation is less likely to accomplish generation skipping and
may produce different results from the anti-lapse approach in use in other states. The heirs
approach would explain the Keinath result (see note 42 supra,) only if Cargill was not married
at the time of the life tenant's death.
92 See note 3 supra. See also, Note, supra note 9, at 918-19, n.72, suggesting that the
relation-back doctrine is necessary to save disclaimers from state law which vests ownership of
intestate (and, in some states, testate) shares in the beneficiaries immediately upon the decedent's death. In circumstances where title vests immediately, the Minnesota approach (see
note 90 supra), to the Keinath facts would, by not relating back to the testator's death, permit
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If the proposal for postponement of the disclaimer time period until the
interest has become indefeasible is adopted, it would seem preferable for state law
to retain the provision that disclaimed property passes as if the disclaimant predeceased the testator. Other considerations support this conclusion. It is usually
assumed that where, as in Keinath, a disclaimer of a future interest is not required
to be made until the termination of the life estate, the beneficiary may also disclaim during the life estate."3 In such a situation, relating the disclaimer back
to the testator's death allows an immediate determination of the alternative
takers, to the advantage of both the disclaimant and the trustee of the life estate.
Moreover, when a beneficiary of a future interest has for many years postponed
his decision to disclaim and alternative takers have died in the interim, complicated problems of disposition may be minimized by the disinclination of the beneficiary to disclaim and pass the property to individuals of more remote relationship.
VI. Summary
The opinions in Keinath 4 portray the best and the worst features of current
disclaimer law: the potential usefulness of the device in estate planning, and the
remaining difficulties in the law.
Because both local property interests and federal tax consequences are involved, neither state nor federal statutory change alone seems sufficient. As a
first step, amendment of the Internal Revenue Code is proposed, which would
assure that 1) disclaimers would be given effect for federal tax purposes if made
within a specified period of time, and 2) in the case of future interests, the disclaimer period would not commence until the interest has become indefeasible.
In addition, to foster uniformity in the tax treatment of domiciliaries of different
states, disclaimers would be recognized for federal tax purposes where state law
does not recognize disclaimers meeting the federal standard. Explicit federal
standards should serve to encourage the states to adopt the Uniform Act, conforming effectiveness standards and disposition provisions, so that the federal tax
consequences will not only be clearly foreseeable, but will be identical from state
to state.

a period of vested ownership which is inconsistent with the theory of disclaimer. This shortcoming is consistent with the interpretation in note 91 supra, that the interest would have to
pass to the disclaimant's heirs (like other property owned at death) rather than by the antilapse statute.
93 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, supra note 67,
at 8. Accord, Coleman v. Bums, 103 N.H. 313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961).
94 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), reo'g, 58 T.C. 352 (1972).

